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Opening the Rule 10b-5 Floodgates:                                     
Ninth Circuit Split in Gilead Sciences Leaves the             
Loss Causation Pleading Standard in Limbo 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the case of In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litigation,1 the 
Ninth Circuit allowed a class action securities fraud complaint to 
proceed beyond Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal without any factual basis to 
demonstrate proximate causation, or more specifically, that plaintiffs’ 
losses were caused by the alleged fraud rather than other 
confounding factors. The court also approved plaintiffs’ causation 
theory alleging that an “efficient” securities market took three 
months to incorporate a public fraud disclosure into share prices of 
the defendant corporation, Gilead Sciences. The standards to which 
the court held plaintiffs’ complaint run contrary, however, to the 
prevailing loss causation pleading standards among circuit courts, 
and cut at the policies underlying private securities litigation.  
Although pre-discovery pleading standards are not traditionally 
fraught with heavy evidentiary burdens, Congress and the Supreme 
Court have imposed heightened pleading requirements for securities 
suits to cut back on frivolous litigation. The Ninth Circuit threatens 
to undermine these procedural safeguards by introducing a highly 
permissive loss causation standard that fails to sift meritorious claims 
from implausible or highly speculative in terrorem securities fraud 
suits. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. The Circumstances Precipitating Litigation 
A group of investors who purchased stock in Gilead Sciences, 
Inc. (“Gilead”) between July 14, 2003, and October 28, 2003, 
brought a class action securities fraud suit against Gilead on 
December 2, 2005.2 The plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint 
 
 1. 536 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1993 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 1050; In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 1320466, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 
12, 2006). 
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alleges that Gilead violated, inter alia, section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 by misleading the 
investing public to believe that demand for its most popular product 
was strong without disclosing that unlawful marketing was a 
significant cause of new sales growth.3 
Gilead is a biopharmaceutical company that specializes in 
developing and commercializing medications to treat life-threatening 
diseases.4 The company’s most successful product is Viread, an 
antiretroviral medication introduced in 2001 to treat HIV/AIDS.5 
Viread was so successful that Gilead raised the product’s price in 
June of 2003.6 On July 14, 2003, the first day of the class period, 
Gilead issued a press release announcing that its second quarter 
financial results would exceed expectations, driven primarily by the 
“strong sales growth of Viread.”7 The release explained that Viread 
sales increased due to “broader prescribing patterns . . . as well as 
increases in U.S. wholesaler inventory.”8 Two weeks later, on July 
31, 2003, Gilead issued another press release disclosing second 
quarter revenues of $230.7 million, more than half of which related 
to Viread sales.9 The same day, an officer of Gilead explained to 
analysts and other investors that Viread sales would likely fall in the 
third quarter because wholesalers amassed substantial stockpiles of 
Viread in anticipation of the product’s June price increase.10 
Notwithstanding this caveat, market analysts—including Morgan 
Stanley, Prudential, and Bear Stearns—continued to predict strong 
demand for Viread.11 
Plaintiffs allege that Viread’s strong sales performance was driven 
by illegal “off-label” marketing, which refers to the use of marketing 
information such as clinical study results on the efficacy of an FDA-
approved product that have not been approved by the FDA for 
inclusion in the product’s package labeling.12 Gilead’s off-label 
 
 3. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1050–51.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1051–52. 
 7. Gilead, 2006 WL 1320466, at *1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at *1–2.  
 11. Id. at *2.  
 12. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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marketing allegedly took three forms: “1) marketing to HIV patients 
co-infected with Hepatitis B; 2) marketing Viread as a first-line or 
initial therapy for HIV infection; and 3) marketing against Viread’s 
safety profile.”13 The company began training sales and marketing 
employees as early as 2001 with off-label product information, and 
implicitly or explicitly encouraged them to use the information to 
sell Viread through and subsequent to the class period.14 Two 
confidential witnesses also allege that as much as 85% to 95% of their 
own Viread sales were the result of off-label marketing.15 
Gilead’s off-label marketing did not go unnoticed by the FDA. 
On March 14, 2002, the FDA sent an “Untitled Letter” ordering 
Gilead to cease marketing activities that understate the risk of 
Viread.16 Gilead agreed to cease all off-label marketing activity, but 
the FDA followed up a year later on July 29, 2003, with a “Warning 
Letter” 17 (“FDA Warning Letter”) chastising the company for “oral 
statements that minimized the risk information and broadened the 
indication for Viread.”18 Notwithstanding the FDA’s public release 
of the Warning Letter on August 7, 2003, Gilead shares closed at 
higher prices on both August 7 and August 8.19 
Although wholesalers and doctors allegedly understood the 
significance of the FDA Warning Letter—purportedly indicated by 
declining Viread sales during the third quarter of 200320—plaintiffs 
 
 13. Id.; Gilead, 2006 WL 1320466, at *2.  
 14. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1051. 
 15. Gilead, 2006 WL 1320466, at *3 n.4. Plaintiffs allege that between $86.7 and 
$109.82 million of Viread’s $115.6 million in sales during the second quarter of 2003 was 
attributable to off-label marketing. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1052 n.4.  
 16. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1051. 
 17. Gilead Sciences, Inc., FDA Warning Letter, MACMIS No. 11723 (July 29, 2003), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory 
Information/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPha
rmaceuticalCompanies/UCM168912.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).  
 18. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1052–53.  
 19. Id. at 1053.  
 20. Id. at 1054 (explaining plaintiffs’ theory that disappointing third quarter Viread sales 
were attributable to “lower end-user demand” caused by the FDA Warning Letter). Contra 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13–14, Gilead Sciences., Inc. v. St. Clare, 129 S. Ct. 1993 
(2009) (No. 08-1021), 2009 WL 355727 (explaining that Viread end-user demand actually 
grew by up to 17% during the third quarter). Market analysts—including Morgan Stanley and 
Bear Stearns—attributed Viread’s overall sales decline to excessive wholesaler inventory 
stockpiling during the second quarter, indicating that second quarter “end-user demand run 
rates were actually lower than previously believed. Thus, while Viread demand continue[d] to 
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allege that the market failed to comprehend the implications of 
Gilead’s off-label marketing activity.21 In addition, although Gilead 
acknowledged the FDA Warning Letter in its August 14, 2003, 
second quarter 10-Q filing,22 plaintiffs argue that Gilead’s failure to 
discuss the activities giving rise to the letter and the impact the letter 
would have on Viread sales amounted to a material omission 
necessary to make Gilead’s financial statements not misleading.23 In 
other words, Gilead failed to disclose that Viread’s sales growth was 
attributable largely to illegal marketing activity, thus artificially 
inflating both wholesalers’ Viread inventory and Gilead share prices.  
The investing public, plaintiffs argue, did not appreciate the 
impact of the off-label marketing until Gilead released its 
disappointing third quarter Viread sales figures on October 28, 
2003, the last day of the class period.24 The market learned that 
Viread sales fell significantly below third quarter projections because 
wholesalers were filling prescriptions with surplus inventory rather 
than reordering from Gilead at commensurate levels.25 The following 
day, Gilead shares fell 12% from $59.46 to $52.00.26 Plaintiffs 
explain this loss as the market’s realization of the extent to which off-
label marketing affected Viread sales, which, taken in light of the 
August 7 FDA Warning Letter, amounted to a full disclosure of 
Gilead’s fraud.27 
B. District Court Ruling 
The district court granted Gilead’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss,28 concluding that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead loss 
causation pursuant to the standard in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
 
grow,” wholesalers filled existing orders with excessive inventory rather than purchasing 
additional product from Gilead. Id. at 13 (second emphasis added). 
 21. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1053–54.  
 22. Gilead Sciences, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 14 (Aug. 14, 2003). 
 23. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1053.  
 24. Id. at 1054. 
 25. Id.; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at 13–14. 
 26. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1054. 
 27. Id. Contra Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at 14 (explaining that 
Gilead, market analysts, and plaintiffs themselves in previous filings, attributed the entire drop 
in Gilead’s stock price on October 29, 2003, to Gilead’s underestimation of wholesaler 
overstocking and lower sales growth in Europe). 
 28. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 1320466, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2006).  
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Broudo.29 The court explained that Dura requires plaintiffs to plead 
proximate causation, but the complaint in this case failed to attribute 
the loss in Gilead’s stock value to the alleged fraud rather than other 
superseding causes.30 Specifically, the plaintiffs  
[did] not connect the following chain of events . . . : 1) that 
Defendants’ alleged failure to disclose the off-label marketing 
scheme caused a material increase in sales; 2) that practitioners 
materially decreased their demand for Viread due to the publication 
of the FDA Warning Letter; and most importantly, 3) that the 
alleged decrease in sales due to the FDA letter proximately caused 
Gilead’s stock to decrease three months later.31 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 
The Securities Exchange Act of 193432 (“Exchange Act”) created 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and provides the 
statutory basis for what courts have recognized as an implied private 
right of action for securities fraud.33 Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act, as amended, prohibits the “use or employ . . . [of] any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors.”34 Pursuant to this section, the SEC promulgated Rule 
10b-5, which makes it unlawful: 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or 
 
 29. Id. at *9–10; see 544 U.S. 336, 346–47 (2005). 
 30. Gilead, 2006 WL 1320466, at *9. 
 31. Id. at *9 n.12. 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).  
 33. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 34. Id. 
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.35 
Although neither Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act nor Rule 
10b-5 expressly provides a private civil remedy for securities fraud,36 
federal courts have inferred such a right since the 1940s.37 The 
modern common law rule for private 10b-5 actions—aptly described 
by the Court as a “judicial oak which has grown from little more 
than a legislative acorn”38—includes the following elements:  
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter, i.e., a 
wrongful state of mind; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of 
a security; (4) reliance, often referred to in cases involving public 
securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as “transactional 
causation,”; (5) economic loss; and (6) “loss causation,” i.e., a causal 
connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.39  
B. The Dura Loss Causation Pleading Standard 
The Supreme Court laid out the pleading standard for loss 
causation in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Brudo, a case involving 
plaintiffs who alleged that they suffered damages by purchasing 
securities in Dura at artificially inflated prices.40 The Court rejected 
the Ninth Circuit’s lax pleading standard, which only required 
plaintiffs to “‘establish’ . . . that ‘the price on the date of purchase was 
inflated because of misrepresentation.’”41 Reasoning that 
shareholders who purchase securities at an inflated price may never in 
fact suffer any losses, the Court held that plaintiffs must allege both 
 
 35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 36. Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729–30 (1975).  
 37. The first federal court to recognize a private civil remedy to securities fraud was the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kardon v. National 
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (1946). The U.S. Supreme Court approved the 
overwhelming judicial consensus in favor of the private 10b-5 action twenty-five years later in 
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).  
 38. Blue Chips Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737.  
 39. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (internal citations 
omitted).  
 40. Id. at 339–40.  
 41. Id. at 342 (internal citations omitted).  
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economic loss and proximate causation to demonstrate loss causation 
in the complaint.42 
Though Dura identified the minimum pleading requirement for 
loss causation, it did not define the intricate nuances of that 
standard. Indeed, the Court held only that a plaintiff must provide a 
“‘short and plain statement’ . . . provid[ing] the defendant with ‘fair 
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests,’”43 as well as “some indication of the loss and the causal 
connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”44 In line with this 
standard, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving—and thus alleging—
that their economic loss was caused by the misrepresentation and not 
by other confounding factors.45  
C. Fraud-on-the-Market Theory 
Class action plaintiffs generally rely on the “fraud-on-the-
market” theory (also known as the “semi-strong efficient capital 
markets hypothesis,” or “efficient market theory”) to demonstrate 
reliance, materiality, and loss causation in securities fraud actions. 
Approving the theory’s application to demonstrate reliance in Basic, 
Inc. v. Levinson,46 the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he fraud on the 
market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and 
developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is 
determined by the available material information regarding the 
company and its business.”47 In other words, well-developed markets 
presumptively incorporate all publicly available information into 
share prices. The legal application of this theory supports the 
 
 42. Id. at 346 (“[W]e find the Ninth Circuit’s approach inconsistent with the law’s 
requirement that a plaintiff prove that the defendant’s misrepresentation (or other fraudulent 
conduct) proximately caused the plaintiff’s economic loss. . . . Our holding about plaintiff’s 
need to prove proximate causation and economic loss leads us also to conclude that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint here failed to adequately allege these requirements.” (emphasis added)).  
 43. Id. at 346 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  
 44. Id. at 347. 
 45. Id. at 342–43 (“When the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a 
lower price, that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed 
economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific 
facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of 
that lower price. . . . [O]ne might say that the inflated purchase price suggest that the 
misrepresentation . . . ‘touches upon’ a later economic loss. But, . . .  [t]o ‘touch upon’ a loss 
is not to cause a loss . . . .” (emphasis added, internal citations omitted)).  
 46. 485 U.S. 224, 245–46 (1988). 
 47. Id. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
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presumption that anyone who purchases or sells stock within a 
specified period relies on the integrity of the market price as an 
accurate reflection of the stock’s value in light of all publicly available 
information.48 Thus, if a company misrepresents material information 
to the investing public, all investors presumptively rely on that 
misrepresentation.49 Litigants also use this theory to demonstrate 
materiality by showing that a particular piece of information was 
significant in light of the market’s reaction to its disclosure, as well as 
loss causation by showing a significant market reaction soon after the 
corrective disclosure was made.50 
While the Basic Court did “not intend conclusively to adopt any 
particular theory of how quickly and completely . . . information is 
reflected in market price,”51 the efficient market theory only makes 
sense when the market reacts promptly to corrective disclosures.52 
Nearly all circuit courts describe this as a “quick,”53 “rapid,”54 or 
“immediate”55 process.56 If markets do not operate rationally by 
 
 48. Id. at 246–47; Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law and 
Finance Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Gilead Scis., Inc. v. St. 
Clare, 129 S. Ct. 1993 (2009) (No. 08-1021), 2009 WL 720917. 
 49. The Supreme Court adopted the “fraud on the market” theory as a practical way for 
class action plaintiffs to demonstrate reliance. To require individualized proof would impose an 
unreasonable burden on plaintiffs and frustrate class certification in most 10b-5 actions because 
individual questions would overwhelm common question of law and fact. Basic, 485 U.S. at 
242.  
 50. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 48, at 6–7.  
 51. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.28.  
 52. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 48, at 6.  
 53. See, e.g., In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[The] 
market price responds so quickly to new information that ordinary investors cannot make 
trading profits on the basis of such information.” (emphasis added)); West v. Prudential Sec., 
Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 54. See, e.g., Gariety v. Grant Thornton LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 367 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(“[A]n efficient market . . . ‘adjusts rapidly to reflect all new information.’” (quoting Jonathan 
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-
Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (1990))); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 
915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990) (“An efficient market is one which rapidly reflects new 
information in price.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 
F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Evidence that unexpected corporate events or financial 
releases cause an immediate response in the price of a security has been considered . . . ‘the 
essence of an efficient market and the foundation for the fraud on the market theory.’” (quoting 
Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1287 (D.N.J. 1989))) (emphasis added); Unger v. 
Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2005) (“In an efficient market, where information 
is nearly perfect, material misstatements alter a stock’s price almost immediately.”); In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[E]fficient 
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quickly incorporating all publicly available information, plaintiffs 
cannot look to the market’s reaction to new information to 
demonstrate materiality, reliance, or loss causation. Indeed, if the 
securities markets take months to incorporate new information, no 
one could ever attribute market behavior to particular stimuli 
because he could not credibly claim to know whether the market was 
reacting to new information or progressively incorporating old 
information. The Supreme Court recognized this principle in Dura, 
warning that “the longer the time between purchase and sale, . . . 
the more likely that other factors caused the loss.”57 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that the 
plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint sufficiently alleged loss 
causation to withstand Gilead’s motion to dismiss.58 Writing for the 
unanimous panel, Judge Michael Daly Hawkins applied the standard 
that “[s]o long as the complaint alleges facts that, if taken as true, 
plausibly establish loss causation, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is 
inappropriate.”59 
A. Proximate Causation and Fact Pleading 
Defining the loss causation pleading standard, the court 
explained that a plaintiff “‘must demonstrate a causal connection 
between the deceptive acts that form the basis for the claim of 
securities fraud and the injury suffered by the plaintiff.’”60 Although 
the misrepresentation need not be the “sole reason for the decline in 
value of the securities, . . . it must be a ‘substantial cause.’”61 The 
court declined to rule whether Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to the loss causation pleading 
 
markets are those in which information important to reasonable investors . . . is immediately 
incorporated into stock prices.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 56. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 48, at 6–7.  
 57. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (emphasis added).  
 58. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 59. Id. at 1057 (“This is not ‘a probability requirement . . . it simply calls for enough 
fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of loss causation.’” 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007))).  
 60. Id. at 1055 (quoting In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005)).  
 61. Id. at 1055–56 (emphasis added) (quoting Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 
1441, 1447 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997)).  
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:21 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
310 
standard, holding simply that the complaint must provide “‘sufficient 
detail to give defendants ample notice of [plaintiff’s] loss causation 
theory, and to give us some assurance that the theory has a basis in 
fact.’”62 
The Ninth Circuit chastised the district court for its 
“incredulity,” explaining that loss causation is more appropriately a 
matter of proof at trial and should not to be decided on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, unless the plaintiff fails to allege facts 
that “plausibly establish loss causation.”63 Specifically, the court took 
issue with the district court’s unwillingness to accept (1) “‘the . . . 
inference that a public revelation on August 8 caused a price drop 
three months later on October 28,’” and (2) the court’s finding that a 
“‘slowing increase in demand, alone, [is] too speculative to 
adequately demonstrate loss causation.’”64  
Regarding the latter of these issues, the Ninth Circuit found that 
a “slowing increase in demand” was not too speculative to 
adequately demonstrate loss causation because, as the plaintiffs 
allege, “physicians were less eager to prescribe Viread,” and 
competitors used the FDA Warning Letter to discourage Gilead 
prescriptions.65 This provided enough factual support to raise a 
“reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the 
FDA Warning Letter’s effect on Viread demand.66 Finding that 
plaintiffs’ theories were “not facially implausible,” the court advised 
the district court to reserve its skepticism for later stages of the 
proceedings.67 “A well-pleaded complaint,” Judge Hawkins 
concluded, “may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual 
proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote 
and unlikely.”68  
 
 62. Id. at 1056 (emphasis added) (quoting Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 
F.3d 982, 989–90 (9th Cir. 2008)).  
 63. Id. at 1057 (citing In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 1320466, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. May 12, 2006)).  
 64. Id. (quoting In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 1320466, at *7, 7 n.10 (N.D. 
Cal. May 12, 2006)). 
 65. Id. at 1058.  
 66. Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
 67. Id. at 1057.  
 68. Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555).  
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B. Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and Loss Causation Timing 
Turning to the district court’s concern over the three month 
delay between the off-label marketing disclosure on August 8 and 
the drop in Gilead’s stock price on October 28, the Ninth Circuit 
“rejected a ‘bright-line rule requiring an immediate market reaction’ 
because ‘[t]he market is subject to distortions that prevent the ideal 
of a free and open public market from occurring.’”69 Instead, courts 
must engage in a “fact-specific inquiry” to determine the functional 
efficiency of a particular market.70  
As applied to this case, the Ninth Circuit’s America West 
standard purportedly provides that a “limited temporal gap” of even 
three months between the date Gilead’s off-labeling marketing was 
publicly revealed and the subsequent drop in share prices “does not 
render [the] plaintiff[s’] theory of loss causation per se implausible.”71 
The court reasoned that because the market was not aware that off-
label marketing was the “cornerstone” of Viread sales,72 and the drop 
in share prices occurred immediately after Gilead disclosed 
disappointing third quarter revenues—purportedly caused by 
declining end-user demand73—the market did not comprehend the 
full extent of Gilead’s fraud until October 28, 2003. Plaintiffs allege, 
moreover, that the purportedly lower end-user demand was caused 
by the FDA Warning Letter in August.74 Thus, physicians reasonably 
could have responded to the FDA Warning Letter by prescribing 
alternative medications while the investing public failed to appreciate 
the letter’s significance.75 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that the complaint 
sufficiently alleged “a causal relationship between (1) the increase in 
sales resulting from the off-label marketing, (2) the Warning Letter’s 
effect on Viread orders, and (3) the Warning Letter’s effect on 
Gilead’s stock price.”76  
 
 69. Id. at 1057–58 (quoting No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust 
Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003)).  
 70. Id. at 1058 (quoting Am. W. Holding, 320 F.3d at 934).  
 71. Id. (emphasis added).  
 72. Id. at 1056.  
 73. Id. at 1058. Contra text accompanying note 20. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1057. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Gilead is problematic for two 
reasons: first, the plaintiffs’ theory is not “plausible” because it is 
inconsistent with prevailing securities law, or more specifically, it 
undermines the fraud-on-the-market theory upon which plaintiffs’ 
very claims hinge. Additionally, the court did not require plaintiffs to 
show proximate causation by alleging facts that would allow the 
court to ascribe some rough proportion of the whole loss to the 
alleged fraud rather than other confounding factors. Although the 
court’s general loss causation standard—that plaintiffs must “allege[] 
facts that, if taken as true, plausibly establish loss causation”77—does 
not facially contradict Dura, the court did not rigorously apply its 
own pleading standards to the facts at hand in Gilead. More 
importantly, the Ninth Circuit set an impermissibly lax loss causation 
pleading bar by overlooking Congress’s objectives in contemporary 
securities litigation reforms.  
A. Policies Underlying Modern Securities Regulation 
The pleading standard for loss causation in a Rule 10b-5 action 
must be informed by the competing policies underlying securities 
regulation: to maintain public confidence in the securities markets by 
deterring fraud and compensating aggrieved shareholders,78 while 
also tempering antifraud measures to prevent vexatious litigation.79 
Congress has recognized that “[p]rivate securities litigation is an 
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their 
losses,” and that private lawsuits “promote public and global 
confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and 
 
 77. Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
 78. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (citing Randall v. 
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986)) (reasoning that securities markets seek to maintain 
public confidence “by deterring fraud, in part, through the availability of private securities 
litigation”); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997); Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (“[T]he 1934 Act and its companion 
legislative enactments embrace a ‘fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a philosophy of full 
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business 
ethics in the securities industry.’” (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 
180, 186 (1963))).  
 79. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347; Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 
739 (1975) (“There has been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents 
a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies 
litigation in general.”).  
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guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and 
others properly perform their jobs.”80 The Supreme Court has thus 
emphasized that pleading standards must “preserv[e] investors’ 
ability to recover on meritorious claims.”81  
Notwithstanding this need, Congress and the Supreme Court 
have pruned back the 10b-5 “judicial oak” to protect defendants 
from frivolous litigation.82 The Blue Chips Stamps Court warned that 
10b-5 securities claims are uniquely vulnerable to vexatiousness 
because they offer a high settlement value to plaintiffs.83 These cases 
typically involve a significant and costly amount of discovery 
requiring extensive deposition of corporate officers and associates 
and the concomitant opportunity for extensive discovery of 
corporate documents.84 Securities fraud suits can also frustrate 
normal business activity of the defendant—which is completely 
unrelated to the lawsuit—and damage corporate goodwill.85 In 
addition, because 10b-5 actions often turn on the credibility of 
competing testimony, many cases are difficult to dispose of prior to 
trial other than by settlement.86 Thus, even an objectively weak claim 
has a settlement value to the plaintiff—in light of the many burdens 
borne by the defendant—so long as he prevents the suit from being 
resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment.87  
To curb this threat, Congress enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”),88 which requires 
plaintiffs to prove, inter alia, “that the act or omission of the 
defendant . . . caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover 
damages.”89 The Supreme Court in Dura made clear that loss 
 
 80. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 80–81 (2006).  
 81. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (“Our task 
is to prescribe a workable . . . standard . . . geared to the PSLRA's twin goals: to curb frivolous, 
lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors' ability to recover on meritorious claims.”).  
 82. Congress explicitly passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to 
provide “protections to discourage frivolous litigation.” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-469, 32 
(1995). 
 83. Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975); see Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 80–81 (2006). 
 84. Blue Chips Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740–41. 
 85. Id. at 740. 
 86. Id. at 742.  
 87. Id. at 740.  
 88. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).  
 89. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000) (emphasis added).  
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causation must not only be proven at trial, but alleged in the 
plaintiff’s complaint.90 To require anything less, the unanimous 
Court reasoned, “would bring about harm of the very sort the 
statutes seek to avoid.”91  
Echoing the warning in Blue Chips Stamps, the Dura Court 
emphasized that a relaxed pleading standard would allow plaintiffs 
with “largely groundless claim[s] to simply take up the time of a 
number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in 
terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably 
founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant 
evidence.”92 The PSLRA and other judicially-wrought standards thus 
forge a reasonable pleading bar against “nuisance filings, targeting of 
deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery requests and 
manipulation by class action lawyers.”93 These limits recognize that 
anti-fraud regulations do not provide investors with “broad 
insurance against market losses,” but rather protect them against the 
economic losses that misrepresentations and omissions actually 
cause.94 
B. Fraud-on-the-Market and “Plausibility” 
The Ninth Circuit requires 10b-5 plaintiffs to allege “facts that, 
if taken as true, plausibly establish loss causation.”95 This standard is 
facially consistent with other circuits, which generally require 
plaintiffs to plead factual allegations that provide a reasonable, non-
speculative basis to believe that plaintiffs can ultimately prove the 
 
 90. Dura Pharms. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (“Our holding about plaintiffs’ 
need to prove proximate causation and economic loss leads us also to conclude that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint . . . [must] allege these requirements.”).  
 91. Id. at 347 (“[A]llowing a plaintiff to forgo giving any indication of the economic 
loss and proximate cause that the plaintiff has in mind would bring about harm of the very sort 
the statutes seek to avoid.”).  
 92. Id. (quoting Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)).  
 93. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007) (“Setting a 
uniform pleading standard for § 10(b) actions was among Congress’ objectives when it enacted 
the PSLRA. Designed to curb perceived abuses of the § 10(b) private action—‘nuisance filings, 
targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery requests and manipulation by class 
action lawyers,’— . . . the PSLRA installed both substantive and procedural controls.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 94. Dura, 544 U.S. at 345 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988)).  
 95. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (emphasis added). 
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elements of causation at trial.96 The Ninth Circuit’s application, 
however, diverges from the prevailing standard. In evaluating the 
Gilead plaintiffs’ allegations, the court required only that the theory 
not be “facially implausible.”97 Indeed, the court allowed plaintiffs’ 
complaint to proceed beyond 12(b)(6) dismissal without any proof 
that the alleged misrepresentation caused the loss rather than other 
confounding factors, and relied upon a causation theory that facially 
contradicted legal principles underlying the plaintiffs’ claim.98 The 
Ninth Circuit’s understanding of “plausibility” is thus impermissibly 
lax.  
Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a plausible proximate link 
between the alleged fraud and the economic loss ensures that only 
reasonably well founded claims proceed to discovery pursuant to the 
policy objectives articulated in the PSLRA and the Court’s 10b-5 
jurisprudence.99 “Plausible” means that the plaintiff’s theory of 
causation is generally sound and logically consistent with prevailing 
securities law, not that the plaintiff will actually be able to prove the 
facts supporting his theory.100 This standard provides a critical 
procedural hurdle against frivolous litigation, ensuring that discovery 
is not used as a fishing expedition to uncover facts necessary to piece 
together a plausible case theory.101  
 
 96. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 4. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits 
apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to securities fraud claims, which requires allegations 
to be pled with “particularity.” See Catogas v. Cyberonics, Inc., 292 F. App’x 311, 312–14 
(5th Cir. 2008); Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 
839 n.10, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2007). The Second, Fourth, and Eight Circuits, while not 
applying Rule 9(b), still require “sufficient factual information to provide the ‘grounds’ on 
which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Schaaf v. 
Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 222 (2008); see also Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147, 158 (2d 
Cir. 2007); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 186 (4th Cir. 2007).  
 97. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1057.  
 98. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 4. 
 99. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (“The [PSLRA] . . . 
makes clear Congress’ intent to permit private securities fraud actions for recovery only where 
plaintiffs adequately allege . . . the traditional elements of causation and loss.”). 
 100. The Ninth Circuit seemed to blur the distinction between evaluating plaintiffs’ 
causal theory and the likelihood that plaintiffs could actually prove the facts underlying that 
theory, suggesting that both should be reserved “for later stages of the proceedings” rather 
than 12(b)(6) dismissal. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1057. 
 101. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (lamenting “abusive” litigation 
tactics, including “the routine filing of lawsuits . . . with only [a] faint hope that the discovery 
process might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action”); Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740–42 (1975).  
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The Ninth Circuit’s criticism of the district court in Gilead was 
misguided because the district court found that plaintiffs’ theory of 
causation was implausible, not that plaintiffs could not prove the 
facts supporting that theory.102 Indeed, the plaintiffs’ theory facially 
contradicts “fraud-on-the-market” principles explicitly adopted in 
Basic and presumed by Congress in the Securities Acts.103 In their 
complaint, plaintiffs allege that although the SEC issued a public 
corrective disclosure revealing Gilead’s off-label marketing activity—
the alleged fraud—on August 7, 2003, the market did not 
comprehend the magnitude of this fraud until after a “limited 
temporal gap” of nearly three months when Gilead issued its third-
quarter financial results on October 28, 2003. Yet, plaintiffs 
simultaneously allege that drug wholesalers and doctors understood 
the implications of the SEC’s off-label marketing letter and scaled 
back purchases and prescriptions, respectively.104 In other words, 
although medical professionals and wholesalers understood the 
implications of the FDA Warning Letter, its significance, 
inexplicably, never dawned upon market analysts, investment 
bankers, individual investors, and other market participants.  
This simply does not comport with the fraud-on-the-market 
theory. Basic instructed that the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption 
is built upon the idea that well-developed markets efficiently 
incorporate all publicly available information into share prices.105 
Moreover, legal application of this theory necessarily presumes that 
markets incorporate public information quickly.106 If markets do not 
comprehend and efficiently incorporate public information, the 
Gilead plaintiffs cannot credibly rely on the market price as an 
accurate representation of share value based on all public 
information, nor can they use the market’s reaction to new 
information to demonstrate materiality or loss causation.  
Although the Ninth Circuit explained that securities markets are 
subject to “distortions,” and courts must therefore engage in “fact-
specific inquiry,” the court curiously omitted any discussion of how a 
reasonable investor could fail to comprehend the magnitude of the 
August 7 Warning Letter, and, more importantly, how the October 
 
 102. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1057.  
 103. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 48, at 9–11. 
 104. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1053, 1058.  
 105. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988).  
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 51–57.  
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28 earnings disclosure revealed anything new other than declining 
Viread sales. The October 28 disclosure did not explain the extent of 
Gilead’s off-label marketing activity, nor did it attribute the declining 
sales to the FDA Warning Letter. Indeed, many analysts attributed 
the decline in Viread sales to wholesalers’ excessive buildup during 
the second quarter in anticipation of Viread’s price increase rather 
than to declining end-user demand, which may have actually grown 
during the third quarter.107  
Instead, the market may have sensibly discounted the FDA 
Warning Letter in light of other factors.108 In any event, because the 
October 28 disclosure did not reveal anything new that the market 
could not apprehend from the August 7 disclosure, the plaintiff’s 
theory of causation is facially implausible. The Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that an “efficient” market can take three months to 
incorporate public information into share prices is also inconsistent 
with the prevailing understanding of the fraud-on-the-market 
theory.109  
C. Pleading Proximate Causation 
The most glaring problem with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is 
the court’s disregard for the Dura proximate causation pleading 
standard, which follows from Dura’s admonition that a plaintiff 
cannot ignore superseding contributory causes when pleading loss 
causation.110 A plaintiff’s causal theory will unravel if his loss can be 
explained more accurately as a product of changed economic 
circumstances, investor expectations, or industry-specific 
conditions.111 Thus, a plaintiff must allege facts that allow the court 
 
 107. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 13–14 (explaining that Viread end-
user demand actually grew by up to 17% during the third quarter). 
 108. At least one of the off-label applications advertised by Gilead has since been 
approved by the FDA. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration Approves Viread(R) for Chronic 
Hepatitis B in Adults, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www. 
medicalnewstoday.com/articles/117958.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2010) (announcing the 
FDA’s approval of Viread for hepatitis B patients). In addition, Gilead’s annual revenue has 
grown by more than 600% in six years, from $868 million in 2003 to more than $5.3 billion in 
2008. See Gilead Sciences, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 42 (Feb. 27, 2009). Thus, in 
light of Gilead’s long-term growth potential and Viread’s expanding medical applications, the 
market could have consciously discounted the significance of the FDA Warning Letter in 
August of 2003.  
 109. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 48, at 9–11. 
 110. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).  
 111. Id. 
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to ascribe some rough proportion of the whole loss to the alleged 
fraud rather than other superseding factors. The Dura Court further 
explained that, all things being equal, the longer the time between 
the purchase and sale of the security, the more likely other factors 
caused the loss.112  
While a plaintiff must prove that the alleged fraud was a 
“substantial cause” of the loss to recover damages at trial, the 
pleading standard only requires him to establish a reasonably well-
founded basis for believing that he will be able to prove substantial 
causation at trial.113 This is a practical standard that bars largely 
groundless claims with only a faint hope that discovery will reveal 
some plausible course of action,114 while preserving for trial plausible 
claims with a “reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process 
will reveal relevant evidence”115 necessary to substantiate the finer 
elements of proportional causation. 
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized this principle in Gilead— 
explaining that while a misrepresentation need not be the “sole 
reason for the decline in value of the securities . . . it must be a 
substantial cause”116—the Gilead opinion lacks any discussion of 
proximate causation, “substantial cause,” or alleged facts that could 
allow the court to ascribe some rough proportion of the total loss to 
Gilead’s off-label marketing. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit rebuked the 
district court’s so-called “incredulity” for rejecting the plaintiffs’ 
deficient theory of causation, explaining that plaintiffs’ complaint 
need only offer “sufficient detail to . . . give [the court] some 
assurance that theory has a basis in fact.”117  
Yet, the court also failed to identify any facts in the complaint 
providing assurance that plaintiffs’ loss causation theory has a basis in 
fact. Significantly, market analysts’ explanations of the drop in 
Gilead’s stock prices contradict that of the plaintiffs. Many analysts 
attributed the decline to excessive wholesaler buildup and declining 
sales growth in Europe. End-user demand for Viread actually grew 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. See In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 114. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (lamenting “abusive” litigation 
tactics, including “the routine filing of lawsuits . . . with only [a] faint hope that the discovery 
process might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action”). 
 115. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347.  
 116. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1055–56 (emphasis added).  
 117. Id. at 1056 (internal quotations omitted).  
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during the third quarter. Moreover, even if plaintiffs demonstrated 
that the decline in Viread sales growth was somehow linked to the 
FDA Warning Letter, they still would not demonstrate a causal 
connection with the stock price decline three months later in 
October. As even the Dura Court warned, the longer the time 
between public disclosure of the alleged fraud and the drop in share 
prices, the less likely the fraud caused the loss.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit has introduced in Gilead Sciences a highly 
permissive pleading standard that allows complaints to proceed 
beyond Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal so long as the theory of causation is 
not “facially implausible,” regardless of whether plaintiffs allege facts 
demonstrating proximate causation. The court also construes the 
word “plausible” to include theories of causation manifestly 
inconsistent with the fraud-on-the-market theory—a principle 
underlying virtually all securities litigation claims. This standard 
betrays the statutory and common law limitations on private 
securities litigation designed to bar highly speculative or implausible 
complaints. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of loss 
causation permits any plaintiff class that has lost share value to search 
retrospectively for a potential cause, plead a logically inconsistent and 
factually unsubstantiated causal link, and proceed beyond the critical 
dismissal stage to discovery.118 This effectively transforms the private 
securities claim into an insurance policy against market losses.119 
Though the Gilead Sciences court would leave evaluation of a 
plaintiff’s loss causation theory to the latter stages of litigation,120 
Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized that frivolous 
litigation must be stopped before the costly discovery process 
 
 118. The Gilead plaintiffs plead three different theories of causation before prevailing on 
appeal with their Fourth Amended Complaint. The first and most plausible theory alleged that 
Gilead’s material misstatement was understating the extent of wholesalers’ stockpiling during the 
second quarter. This was subsequently verified in the October disclosure. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. 
Litig., 2006 WL 1320466, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2006).  
 119. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 345 (“[T]he statutes make [private securities fraud] actions 
available, not to provide investors with broad insurance against market losses, but to protect 
them against those economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause.”).  
 120. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1057 (“[Other circuits have] held that loss causation ‘is a 
matter of proof at trial and not to be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.’ . . . We 
agree.” (emphasis added)).  
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begins.121 Even unmeritorious complaints that survive dismissal offer 
an enormous settlement value to defendants.122 Thus, as the only 
gatekeepers against in terrorem securities suits, federal courts must 
employ Rule 12(b)(6) with a more rigorous standard than that 
offered by the Ninth Circuit.  
 Brandon J. Stoker 
 
 
 
 
 121. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31, (1995) (Conf. Rep.); Dura, 544 U.S. at 347; see 
also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (When the allegations in a 
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, “‘this basic deficiency 
should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties 
and the court.’” (emphasis added)).  
 122. See Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).  
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